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1 Introduction
What are the distributional impacts of innovation? While this question is
today being asked in the context of the jobs that might be destroyed by robots
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012), there is not enough attention on the degree
to which distribution and job creation may be a↵ected by the way that the
gains from innovation — with or without robots — are shared.
In order to assess the distribution of innovation gains between the actors
involved, we need to understand more comprehensively how value is created
and extracted throughout the innovation process. In fact, whereas private or-
ganisations invest in innovation only when they see an opportunity for profits,
public organisations invest in technology from an early stage. Private organisa-
tions may gain disproportionately from this technological knowledge rendered
available by the public sector, as expected returns become less uncertain.
The aim of this paper is to study the mechanism by which some agents access
innovation surplus profits amplifying inequality by means of an evolutionary
simulation model. We focus the model on the risk-reward nexus (Mazzucato,
2013; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013) operating throughout an endogenous
innovation process in an industry with two di↵erent agent-types: (i) the public
sector investing in frontier technology, (ii) private firms using and improving
the new technology to produce a final product. We assess to what extent the
profitability of private firms is conditioned by the role of the public sector
investing in new technology. The model is focused on better understanding the
distribution of gains between public and private actors, and the implications of
this for innovation policy and inequality.
Representing the technology as an pseudo-NK landscape (Valente, 2014) we
describe the interdependence across public and private organisations in the
search for a dominant design, highlighting the collective character of innova-
tion. Firms’ positions in the technological landscape determine the quality of
the final product, thus influencing market shares across competing firms and
conditioning the path of expected profitability. Moreover, for given profitabil-
ity levels, agents behave di↵erently as regards the re-investment of profits into
innovation development. Consequently, heterogeneity in investment heuristics
a↵ects the pace of knowledge accumulation and collective innovation. The pub-
lic sector takes part in this cumulative process by investing directly in R&D,
licensing to private firms access to the new technology, as well as through tax-
ation.
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In order to depict and characterise the industrial dynamics emerging from
the model, we design a set of scenarios with associated simulations, aimed
at understanding how the role of the public sector and the complexity of the
technology shape the distribution of rewards between actors in the industry.
After this brief introduction, the rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 motivates the framework. Section 3 introduces the model. In section
4 we present results of simulation exercises and discuss the emerging patterns.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Risk-Reward Nexus
How should the wealth that an economy generates be distributed? Moral as
well as economic arguments about who should be entitled to what – whether
paid in wages, retained profits, or dividend payments – frequently seek to link
rewards to contributions, for reasons of fairness or e ciency. But how these
contributions are quantified depends first on how they are theorized. In this
way, di↵erent theories of how value is created can be used to justify very dif-
ferent distributions of income and wealth. If entrepreneurs are believed to
make extraordinary contributions to value creation, then maybe extraordinary
rewards are justified?
Key to the problem is that in economic theory the public sector is, at best,
seen as facilitating the process of wealth creation, but not being a key driver of
the process itself. In microeconomics, it is seen as fixing markets, not creating
them. In industrial-innovation economics, its role is limited to spending on
public goods like basic science and de-risking the activities of innovators, and
does not extend to being an innovator itself. In macroeconomics, it is seen as
fixing the business cycle and as a lender of last resort. It is not seen as a lead
risk-taker across the business cycle or an investor of first resort. And if or when
a public agency does dare to make strategic choices and take risks, it is often
accused of crowding out the private-sector actors, or of being too inept to ‘pick
winners’.
Yet the history of capitalism tells us a di↵erent story – the story of a public
sector that has often been responsible for actively shaping and creating markets,
not just fixing them. Indeed, markets themselves should be viewed as outcomes
of the interactions between both public and private actors (Mazzucato, 2013).
Key to understanding the implications of this story is that public invest-
ments in areas like biotechnology, nanotechnology and the Internet were not
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limited to simply funding ‘basic’ research, a typical ‘public good’ in market fail-
ure theory (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). In the US, for example, government
agencies funded areas along the entire innovation chain: both basic and applied
research and, in many cases, provided downstream early stage high-risk finance
to companies deemed too risky by the private financial sector.
The point is not that the private sector is unimportant, but that in new
sectors like biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the emerging green economy,
private businesses have tended to invest only after returns were in clear sight.
The animal spirits of business investors are themselves an endogenous func-
tion of public investment, roused only after public investments have laid the
groundwork in the highest-risk areas. This role of public investment is recog-
nized in terms of the ‘basics’, such as infrastructure (without roads, businesses
would have no way of transporting goods) and protecting private property. But
beyond that it is largely ignored.
A better understanding of risk gives credit to the role of the public sector in
innovative activities. Doing so makes it immediately logical for there to be a
more collective distribution of the rewards, given that the presence of innovation
is a result of a long-term cumulative, collective and uncertain process (and not
just well-timed speculative finance). Central to this understanding is the need
to better identify how the division of ‘innovative labour’ maps into a division of
rewards. The innovation literature has provided many interesting insights on
the former, for example the changing dynamic between large firms, small firms,
government research and individuals in the innovation process. But there is
very little understanding on how rewards are divided. And, as has been argued,
governments and workers also make investments in the innovation process (if
not greater investments) without guaranteed returns (Mazzucato, 2013).
The critical point is the relation between those who bear risk in contributing
their labour and productive capacity to the innovation process and those who
appropriate rewards from the innovation process. To understand this relation
we build upon the risk-reward nexus framework (Mazzucato, 2013; Lazonick
and Mazzucato, 2013). As a general set of propositions of the risk-reward
nexus, when the appropriation of rewards outstrips the bearing of risk in the
innovation process, the result is inequity; when the extent of inequity disrupts
investment in the innovation process, the result is instability; and when the
extent of instability increases the uncertainty of the innovation process, the
result is a slowdown or even decline in economic growth. A major challenge
is to put in place institutions to regulate the risk-reward nexus so that it sup-
4
ports equitable and stable economic growth. In the sections that follow, we
introduce and discuss an evolutionary model that substantiates the dynamics
just described. In particular, with the model we aim at understanding the
public-private interaction mechanisms underlying the imbalance between risks
and rewards, and the role of the public sector in their realignment.
3 The model
We present an agent-based simulation model of technological competition in an
industry producing a final product. There are two agent types: A (public sec-
tor) and B (private firms). There is one instance of type-A and nB(t) instances
of type-B, indexed as i = 1, 2, . . . , nB(t) for each time period t.1
3.1 Technology and innovation development
One crucial aspect by which innovation is an uncertain process stems from
the non-linearity between an agent’s R&D investment and the obtention of a
product of higher quality.2 Thus, a key channel through which risk is pervasive
in innovation development lies in the complexity of the technology that maps
research e↵orts to an output of higher quality.
In this sense, in our framework technology is represented by the fitness land-
scape of a pseudo-NK model (Valente, 2014): an N -dimensional multi-peaked
surface (with a unique global peak) with K-interactions among dimensions (see
Figure 1, for an example). The landscape is a correspondence that maps a
position vector xi(t) 2 RN into a fitness value ↵i(t) 2 R. A technology consists
of N components, whose combination (given by xi(t)) determines the quality
of the final product obtained (↵i(t)).3
Each dimension in the landscape represents a component of a new technology
being introduced into the economy. Every agent (the public sector or private
firm) explores the landscape, and each position (e.g. (x1, x2) in Figure 1) has a
fitness score associated to it (the value on the vertical axis associated to (x1, x2)
in Figure 1). The global peak represents the dominant design (Klepper, 1996)
1The number of private firms nB(t) changes through time.
2In this model we mainly deal with product innovations rather than process innovations. Hence, our emphasis
is on higher product quality rather than reductions in production costs.
3The pseudo-NK model is a variant of NK models (Kau↵man, 1993) that improves on easiness of implemen-
tation, amongst other advantages. For details, see Valente (2014, pp. 112-3). A related exploration can
be found in Ciarli et al. (2008). Moreover, the representation of production processes by means of an NK
model from a neoclassical perspective can be found in Auerswald et al. (2000).
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Figure 1: Example of fitness landscape for N=2 (Valente, 2014, p. 117)
of the new technology.
Technology components may be mutually dependent on each other. One of
the channels to assess the complexity of the innovation process consists in the
degree of connection between each pair of components that define the technol-
ogy (i.e. each pair of dimensions of the landscape). For any given couple of
dimensions j and k, ajk represents the degree to which component j depends
on component k, and this degree ranges from 0 (complete independence) to
1 (maximum interdependence). A high degree of interdependence between di-
mensions j and k means that a movement along dimension j, for di↵erent values
of k, changes the impact of dimension j on fitness from negative (positive) to
positive (negative).
Formally, in an N -dimensional landscape, each agent i has associated a land-
scape position vector at every time period t:
xi(t) = [xij(t)] = (x
i
1(t), x
i
2(t), . . . , x
i
N(t)) (1)
The contribution to fitness of each dimension j = 1, . . . , N is given by:
 ij(x
i(t)) =
1
1 + |xij(t)   ij(xi(t))|
(2)
where  ij(x
i(t)):
 ij(x
i(t)) =  j +
NX
k=1
ajk(t)x
i
k(t) (3)
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is the target contribution to fitness of dimension j for agent i during t.
From the equations above, we can see that the contribution to fitness for
agent i in dimension j,  ij(x
i(t)), is the reciprocal of the absolute deviation of
its current position xij(t) from a target  
i
j(x
i(t)) that provides the maximum
contribution to fitness. Note carefully that this target depends on the current
position of the agent in all other dimensions, making the assessment of fitness-
improvement changes an interdependent process.
After computing  ij(x
i(t)) for each dimension j, the fitness of agent i in an N -
dimensional landscape is the average contribution to fitness across dimensions:
↵i(t) =
1
N
NX
j=1
 ij(x
i(t)) (4)
At each time-period an agent obtains a fitness score ↵i(t), which is the out-
come of its landscape exploration. The exploration strategy of agent i to change
its landscape position is that of ‘one-bit mutation’: at every time period t each
agent takes a number of steps on the landscape. Each step consists in randomly
choosing one of the N dimensions and moving along it by increasing/decreasing
the intensity of use of the technology component associated to it. Such an in-
creased intensity in one direction, when combined with the remaining N   1
components, may lead to higher or lower fitness. If the candidate position is
fitness-improving with respect to the current one, the new position is adopted
and ↵i(t) has increased.
However, given the ‘rugged’ nature of the landscape, throughout this gradual
and local search process firms risk facing a lock-in problem: landscape explo-
ration may not lead to any increase in fitness at a local level. In this case,
the flow of resources (e.g. R&D expenditure) that has gone into exploring the
technology landscape does not lead to any improvement in the quality of the
final product.
Thus, to monitor the process of innovation development at an aggregate level,
we consider the average contribution to fitness across private firms:
↵B(t) =
1
nB(t)
nB(t)X
i=1
↵i(t) (5)
where nB(t) is the number active firms (type-B agents) exploring the landscape
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at time t; the contribution of the public sector:
↵A(t) = ↵
A(t) (6)
as well as the average contribution to fitness for the economy as a whole:
↵(t) =
1
nB(t) + 1
0@nB(t)X
i=1
↵i(t) + ↵A(t)
1A (7)
The number of landscape steps (i.e. the number of one-bit mutations) that
every agent i takes is an increasing function of its R&D expenditure:
 i(t) =  (RDi(t)),
d 
dRDi(t)
> 0 (8)
i.e. the higher the R&D e↵ort, the more steps a firm takes, having more chances
of improving its fitness.
Hence, R&D intensity fuels the process of landscape exploration by which
each agent accumulates skills and contributes to creating value in the economy
(i.e. increasing the quality of its product). However, the value that is created
within organisations (private firms and the public sector) through innovation
development is realised (and extracted) via a process of market competition.
We turn to this aspect below.
3.2 Final demand, market shares, value creation and extraction
We consider a single industry that produces a final product. The size of the
market, i.e. total final demand F (t) is functionally related to average product
quality by a logistic curve (reflecting non-linearity and saturation e↵ects):4
F (t) =
100
1 + e  1( 2↵(t)  3)
(9)
where product quality is given by the average contribution to fitness of the
technology landscape, ↵(t). Throughout our analysis, the quality of the final
product for each firm is given by its contribution to fitness ↵i(t). 5
4Parameters ( 1, 2, 3) govern the shape of the curve. In our implementation, ( 1, 2, 3) = (0.35, 50, 35).
5Thus, this formulation explicitly links the co-evolution of demand and technology (c.f. Winter, 1984, p. 305),
acknowledging that the pace and direction of technical change and the di↵usion of the product are crucially
related (Metcalfe, 1981).
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Figure 2 illustrates the functional relation between the size of the market and
average contribution to landscape fitness (i.e. product quality) distinguishing
between stages of the technology life-cycle associated to the final product of the
industry.6 Note that final demand is comprised between [0, 100], thus it may
be interpreted as the percentage of adopters throughout the di↵usion process
of the product associated to the new technology.
Figure 2: Functional relation between Final Demand F (t) and average product
quality ↵(t) over the technology life-cycle
Final demand addressed to each firm f i(t) is a share ✓i(t) in total final
demand F (t):
f i(t) = ✓i(t)F (t), such that
nB(t)X
i=1
f i(t) = F (t) (10)
where ✓i(t) is the market share of the i-th. firm at time t.
The evolution of market shares ✓i(t) is determined by a replicator equation
(Metcalfe, 1998), which crucially depends on the extent to which the product
quality of a firm, ↵i(t), is above/below the (lagged) average for type-B agents,
6The role of the public sector (type-A agent) during the gestation phase of the technology life-cycle will be
detailed below.
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↵B(t  1):
✓i(t) = ✓i(t  1)
✓
1 +  
↵i(t)  ↵B(t  1)
↵B(t  1)
◆
(11)
where   is the intensity of replicator dynamics, ↵i(t) is the product quality of
the product of the i-th. firm at time t, and ↵B(t   1) is the (lagged) average
product quality across nB(t  1) firms at time t  1.
Equation (11) crucially links technological competition to market competi-
tion. The process of technological exploration is non-linear and its outcome
uncertain. For each firm, fitness-increasing movements in one direction are
contingent on the position in other dimensions. Each agent’s position in the
landscape maps into a fitness score that measures distance to the dominant
design, determining the quality of its final product, and hence its market share.
Thus, firms with higher fitness gain market share at the expense of those whose
fitness is stagnant.
The value created within each firm by means of quality improvements results
in income generation when profits ⇡i(t) are realised through sales f i(t), net
of R&D expenditure for technological exploration RDi(t), taxes on revenues
⌧f i(t), and the payment to the public sector of a license to access the new
technology ciA(t):
7
⇡i(t) = (1  ⌧)f i(t) RDi(t)  ciA(t) (12)
The role of innovation development in market competition was established
by equation (11), whereas the reverse feedback is obtained by linking current
expenditure in R&D to the path of past sales:
RDi(t) =
(
⌘(1  ⌧)f i(t  1), if ✓(i)(t) < 1/2 and F (t) > 50
⌘(1  ⌧)f i(t  1), otherwise (13)
where (⌘, ⌘), with ⌘ < ⌘ indicate alternative propensities to spend in R&D out
of (net-of-taxes) sales. These parameters represent a leakage from the profits-
investment nexus, by which only a part of past sales is invested in R&D and
the reminder is extracted.
Decision rule (13) renders endogenous the process through which agents
switch between two R&D spending regimes: if one firm has captured more
than half of the size of the market, and the percentage of adopters is beyond
7We will describe in more detail the role of taxes and licensing below.
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50%, then the agent switches from a high (⌘) to a low (⌘) R&D expenditure
regime. This regime switch is a mechanism that allows financial agents in
control of a firm to extract a higher share of the value created by the agent.
3.3 Firm dynamics, entry and exit: competition regimes
Firm dynamics exhibits a process of cumulative causation. Firm i explores
the fitness landscape describing its technological capacity to produce the final
product. The fitness score it obtains, ↵i(t) in (4), measures the distance to the
dominant design. The distance to the dominant design sets the quality of the
final product. Product quality di↵erentials determine the evolution of market-
shares, ✓i(t) in (11), distributing total final demand, F (t) in (9), amongst active
firms in the industry. Current firm sales f i(t) fuel next-period R&D spending,
RDi(t + 1) in (13). In this way, R&D expenditure maps into a number of
landscape steps,  (i)(t+1) in (8), determining a new fitness score ↵i(t+1) that
re-ignites the loop.
Entry of a new firm occurs at given time intervals. The new firm is randomly
allocated to a landscape position xi(t), i = nB(t)+1, which determines its fitness
score, ↵i(t), i = nB(t) + 1. If the entrant pays the license cost its location will
be no worse than the position reached by the public sector, otherwise it will be
drawn from a uniform distribution on an interval ranging between the maximum
distance and the closest position to the dominant design, for each landscape
dimension.8
Each entrant arrives to the market with a product which, a priori, resembles
as much as possible the one produced by the incumbent with highest market
share. Thus, inspired by Bass (1963), we assume it appeals to some consumers
who switch to this new product. However, soon after entry, through the process
of technological exploration and the associated quality, these consumers may
find out that the entrant’s product is not as good as the incumbent’s, switching
again to the higher-quality product of the latter. Formally, new entrants rip a
percentage ✏ of the market share of the biggest incumbent:
✓i(t) = ✏✓max(t), i = nB(t) + 1 (14)
where ✓max(t) = {✓k(t) : ✓i(t)  ✓k(t), 8i = 1, . . . , nB(t)}.
8Formally, if firm i entering at time period t pays the license cost to the public sector, its initial landscape
position for dimension j will be xij(t) = min{|xAj (t) x⇤j |, |xenvj (t) x⇤j |}, where x⇤j is the position in dimension
j associated to the fitness score of the dominant design and xenvj (t) is the envelope position for that dimension
across agents at time t, i.e. xenvj (t) = {xkj (t) : |xkj (t)  x⇤j |  |xij(t)  x⇤j |, 8i 2 {1, . . . , nB(t), A}}.
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As time goes by, due to the selection mechanism in equation (11), the in-
cumbent may recover a privileged market position thanks to its above-average
fitness score, and entrants may reduce their market shares if their product
quality is below-average.
Finally, we assume a firm exits the industry when its market share falls below
a minimum threshold:
✓i(T i) = 0, if ✓i(T i) < ✓ (15)
where T i is the exit period for firm i.
Thus, by recalling that   in (11) stands for the intensity of the replicator
mechanism of market selection, the tuple of parameters ( , ✏, ✓) defines the
competition regime of the industry.
3.4 The public sector, licenses and knowledge spillovers
From the preceding subsections we have seen that the innovation process through
landscape exploration involves high risk with uncertain rewards for private
firms, due to the fact that R&D expenditure does not necessarily translates
into product quality improvements (thus, higher market share and profits).
As has been extensively documented in Mazzucato (2013), processes of suc-
cessful innovation have been triggered by the public sector. This agent explores
the fitness landscape investing in R&D from an early stage, when low product
quality makes it unprofitable and uncertain for private actors to invest in the
new technology.
To represent this fact within the model, the public sector (type-A agent)
starts landscape exploration at the gestation period of the technology life-cycle
(see Figure 2) following the ‘one-bit mutation’ algorithm and expressions (1)-
(4), obtaining average fitness (6). Only after the public sector reaches a fitness
such that the size of the market for the final product — obtained through equa-
tion (9) — attains a minimum threshold, private firms (the nB(t) instances of
type-B agents) start to explore the technology landscape. Thus, R&D per-
formed by the public sector during the gestation period fuels knowledge accu-
mulation that will be later exploited by private firms. But not only: even when
private agents start exploring the landscape, continued R&D e↵orts by the
Public sector contribute to increase current average fitness, increasing product
quality and the size of the market for private firms.
The interaction between the public sector and private firms concerns crucially
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the access to the knowledge generated by the former. In particular, firms
that pay a license to the public sector start from a landscape position that
is no worse than that reached by type-A agent (i.e. knowledge spillovers are
partially internalised). On the contrary, firms that do not pay a license start
exploring the landscape from a random position, with a higher probability of
facing relative backwardness. Moreover, in all cases, firms pay a (fixed) tax
rate on sales to the public sector.
In accounting terms, the public sector spends RDA(t) in R&D to explore the
technology landscape and receives income from the license for operating the
new technology that some type-B agents pay ciA(t), as well as collecting taxes
from firms’ sales. As a result, government income Y A(t) is given by:
Y A(t) =
nB(t)X
i=1
⌧f i(t) +
nLicB (t)X
i=1
ciA(t) RDA(t) (16)
where nLicB (t) is the number of firms that pay the license cost to the public
sector during period t.
Each firm that pays a license ciA(t) to access the new technology will do so
at its time of entry, but also every time it gets stuck in a local peak of the
technology landscape, such that there is no one-bit mutation that may increase
its fitness. In fact, by further paying an additional fee to the public sector,
some private firms access the current state of knowledge accumulated by the
government, and adopt a fitness-improving landscape position that allows them
to exit this lock-in situation. The underlying assumption is that whenever the
public sector gets stuck in a local peak, it has the resources to make a ‘jump’
to a relatively close landscape position and rekindle exploration from there.
Thus, the license cost set by the government and paid by each of the nLicB (t)
firms in period t will be given by:
ciA(t) =
(
⇠KARD(t) 
Pt 1
s=0 c
i
A(s), if first-access or jump
0, otherwise
(17)
where ⇠ is a percentage applied to the accumulated (and capitalised) R&D
expenditure by the public sector KARD(t):
KARD(t) = (1   )KARD(t  1) +RDA(t) (18)
depreciating at rate  .
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If a firm pays a license to access the new technology, equation (17) states that
it will pay ⇠KARD(t) at the time of entry whereas, with each further payment
to obtain the current state of knowledge, it will pay a fixed rate ⇠ on the
increment of accumulated R&D that has taken place since the last time it had
paid a license.
The decision rule of the public sector regarding the amount of R&D expen-
diture in every period is given by:
RDA(t) = max
 
Y A(t  1), RDA (19)
where:
RDA = ◆⇤K⇤RD(T )
 
1  (1   )T (20)
The logic of equation (20) runs as follows: consider a public sector that sets
as its target to reach a share ◆⇤ of total accumulated R&D expenditure K⇤RD(T )
by the end period T of the technology life-cycle, and to achieve it by investing
a constant amount in every period. Then, that fixed amount RDA would have
to satisfy:
◆⇤K⇤RD(T ) =
T 1X
s=0
(1   )sRDA =
= RDA + (1   )RDA + · · ·+ (1   )T 1RDA =
= RDA
T 1X
s=0
(1   )s = RDA
✓
(1   )T   1
(1   )  1
◆
= RDA
✓
1  (1   )T
 
◆
from where expression (20) follows.
Thus, decision rule (19) indicates that when the government is in deficit
(Y A(t   1) < 0) R&D expenditure will amount to RDA, and whenever the
lagged surplus of the public sector is greater than RDA, the government will
accelerate its investment in R&D by spending more than its initial target.9
Note that, as specified by (9), the key driver of final demand (i.e. the size of
the market) is average product quality, ↵(t) in (7). This average is the outcome
of landscape exploration e↵orts fueled by R&D investments, and these invest-
ments depend on the path (size and distribution) of past sales by firms. Thus,
9We assume that the government finances its deficit by obtaining access to resources to be repaid later on.
In any case, public R&D expenditure is financed out of a combination of current taxation, public debt or a
process of endogenous money creation.
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rather than crowding out private R&D investment, public R&D expenditure in-
creases the average fitness of the technology landscape, product quality and the
size of the market, increasing firms’ sales and crowding in further investment
in R&D by private actors.
3.5 The sequence of accounts: skills, inequality and knowledge accumulation
So far we focused only on private firms (type-B agents) and the public sector
(type-A agent). However, to complete the sequence of accounts in the model
and study sources of inequality, we consider the institutional sector of house-
holds.
Household income is composed of wages W (t) and dividends Div(t):
Y H(t) = W (t) +Div(t) (21)
Wages are paid by the public sector and private firms, respectively:
W (t) = WA(t) +WB(t) (22)
We further assume that R&D investment from both type-A and type-B
agents consists in labour costs, i.e. wages paid to specialised R&D workers
who perform research and applied development of new products.10 Formally,
we have:
WA(t) = RDA(t), WB(t) =
nB(t)X
i=1
RDi(t) (23)
Thus, higher investment rates not only accelerate landscape exploration but
also imply a shift of household income towards wages. As a counterpart, it
may be seen from decision rule (13) that when firms switch to a regime of
lower R&D investment out of past sales (characterised by parameter ⌘), they
exert a downward pressure on the share of wages in household income.
Another feature of the model consists in the fact that the generation of skills
by specialised workers is an endogenous process that substantiates the explo-
ration of the technology landscape. Skills developed by workers depend on the
previous outcome of their own research. R&D e↵orts addressed to specialised
labour that result in product quality improvements will be validated by the
10In the US, the share of labour costs in total intramural R&D spending by the sector of business enterprises has
risen from 46% (average 1981-1985) to 66% (average 2009-2013), source: OECD Dataset on Gross Domestic
Expenditure on R&D by sector of performance and type of cost.
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market via higher market shares, profits, investment and wages. Clearly, value
extraction is maximised when the profits-investment nexus is at its minimum
(i.e. as parameter ⌘ approaches zero).
Finally, dividends are determined by total profits across private firms:
Div(t) = ⇧(t), ⇧(t) =
nB(t)X
i=1
⇡i(t) (24)
Operating on the relations just presented, it is straightforward to show that
household income Y H(t) can be equivalently written as:
Y H(t) = ⇧(t) +RD(t), with RD(t) = RDA(t) +
nB(t)X
i=1
RDi(t) (25)
Moreover, household income Y H(t) together with government income Y A(t)
exhaust total final demand F (t):
F (t) = Y A(t) + Y H(t) = W (t) +Div(t) + Y A(t) (26)
Thus, to monitor the aggregate evolution of inequality between wages and
dividends in the model we compute the share of wages in household income:
⌦W (t) =
W (t)
Y H(t)
(27)
Within the model, accumulation takes place through the capitalisation of
R&D expenditures by both the public sector and private firms. Similarly to
expression (18), the stock of capitalised R&D investment by firm i at time t
can be written as:
K iRD(t) = (1   )K iRD(t  1) +RDi(t) (28)
where   is the corresponding depreciation rate.11
In addition to keeping track of accumulated R&D spending, we proxy knowl-
edge accumulation by capitalising only those flows of R&D expenditure which
11The treatment of R&D expenditure as a fixed asset in national accounts is a recent accounting convention
that has only been introduced with the latest UN System of National Accounts 2008 (UN, 2009). For a
critical discussion of this and other issues, see Mazzucato and Shipman (2014).
16
lead to an increases in average fitness, both for each private firm i:
K i(t) =
(
(1   )K iRD(t  1) +RDi(t), if ↵i(t)/↵i(t  1) > 1
0, otherwise
(29)
as well as for the public sector:
KA(t) =
(
(1   )KARD(t  1) +RDA(t), if ↵A(t)/↵A(t  1) > 1
0, otherwise
(30)
3.6 Relative risks and rewards: the Risk-Reward Nexus
To assess the relative roles of type-A (public sector) and type-B (private firms)
agents in the innovation process we introduce metrics that quantify the dis-
tribution of risk taking and profit sharing. We are interested in the relative
risks and rewards between the public sector and private actors exploring the
technology landscape.
Risk for private firm i is defined as:
 i(T i) = (1  ↵i(0))(↵i(T i)  ↵i(0)) (31)
where T i is the exit time of firm i from the market. Essentially, our risk measure
is the product of: (i) the initial distance to the dominant design (1   ↵i(0))
and (ii) the length (in terms of fitness improvements) of the path explored
(↵i(T i)   ↵i(0)). Intuitively, firms that invested early in the technology will
begin from a distant position to the dominant design, implying a higher risk.
Moreover, conditional on its initial position, the more an agent has explored
the more risk it has faced throughout the process.
The same measure of risk taking is applied to the public sector:
 A(T ) = (1  ↵A(0))(↵A(T )  ↵A(0)) (32)
where T is the end period of the analysis.
The relative risk between private firms and the public sector is given by:
 BA(T ) =
 B(T )
 A(T )
, with  B(T ) =
PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T ) 
i(T i)PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T )
(33)
where NB(T ) is the total number of private firms that has populated the model
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between [0, T ], and !i⇡(T ) stands for:
!i⇡(T ) =
PT i
t=1 ⇡
i(t)PT
t=1⇧(t)
(34)
i.e. the share of private firm i in accumulated profits.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, the reward of private firm i is defined by the
time-average of accumulated profits over its lifetime:
µi(T i) =
1
T i
T iX
t=0
⇡i(t) (35)
whereas the reward of the public sector will be the time-average of accumulated
government income over its lifetime:
µA(T ) =
1
T
TX
t=0
Y A(t) (36)
Then, the relative reward between private firms and the public sector is
computed as:
µBA(T ) =
µB(T )
µA(T )
, with µB(T ) =
PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T )µ
i(T i)PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T )
(37)
Finally, the risk-reward nexus is obtained by comparing rewards with re-
spect to risk for each type-B (private firm i) and type-A (public sector) agent,
respectively:
RRN i(T i) =
µi(T i)
 i(T i)
, RRNA(T ) =
µA(T )
 A(T )
(38)
whereas the relative risk-reward ratio between private firms and the public
sector is computed as:
RRNBA (T ) =
RRN
B
(T )
RRNA(T )
, with RRN
B
(T ) =
PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T )RRN
i(T i)PNB(T )
i=1 !
i
⇡(T )
(39)
It emerges from the process of technological and market competition embed-
ded in the model an imbalance between risks (represented by the distance from
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the dominant design of the new technology and the landscape path explored)
and rewards (represented by profitability): private actors starting from the
privileged landscape position achieved by the public sector may reap a higher
share of profits while facing a lower risk. The metrics introduced allow us to
quantify the extent of this imbalance throughout alternative scenarios of the
model.
4 Simulation results
The model presented above cannot be solved analytically, due to the non-
linearities arising from the equations representing agents’ behaviour and their
interdependence. Thus, we codify and implement the model in a discrete-time
simulation platform.12 We define alternative scenarios — each characterised by
a parametric configuration — and perform extensive randomizations for each
of them, in order to control for across-simulation variability. Thus, all results
reported refer to across-run averages over 50 replications for each scenario con-
sidered (see, e.g. Dosi et al., 2010), unless otherwise specified.
In what follows, we first describe four alternative scenarios to study the
role and contribution of public and private agents to the innovation process.
Studying the dynamics of the model through time for a typical run of our
‘benchmark’ parametrization (Scenario 1), we analyse the mechanism by which
some private agents access innovation surplus profits. We then specify met-
rics to assess risks, rewards, inequality and private/public shares in knowledge
accumulation across scenarios. Finally, by (statistically) comparing outcomes
for di↵erent parametrizations we get some insights on how innovation and its
financing leads to inequality.
4.1 Alternative scenarios
We analyse four scenarios that depend on two dimensions: (i) the degree of in-
volvement of the public sector in R&D investment (only early stage vs. through-
out the innovation chain) and (ii) the complexity of the new technology intro-
duced (medium vs. high complexity).
Between each ordered couple of scenarios (1 and 2, 3 and 4) there is a dif-
ference in dimension (ii), whereas within each couple the di↵erence concerns
dimension (i). In particular, scenarios are defined as follows:
12All simulations have been programmed using the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD). For more
information see https://github.com/marcov64/Lsd.
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1. Throughout public R&D, medium tech-complexity:
The public sector is involved in the process of technological exploration
by directly investing in R&D throughout the innovation chain (Through-
out public R&D), in a context in which the intensity of interdependence
between components of the new technology (i.e. dimensions of the fitness
landscape) is of medium complexity (medium tech-complexity).
2. Early public R&D, medium tech-complexity, stringent competition:
The complexity of the technology is identical to that of scenario 1, the dif-
ference lies in the role of the public sector. In scenario 2, the public sector
only performs direct R&D investment only in the early gestation stage
of innovation development whereas, once demand is su cient for private
firms to enter the industry, the public sector lets innovation development
be driven by the private firms (Early public R&D).
3. Throughout public R&D, high tech-complexity:
The public sector is involved throughout the innovation chain by directly
investing in R&D, in a context in which the complexity of the new tech-
nology is high (the contribution to fitness of movements in one landscape
direction heavily depends on the relative position in other dimensions of
the landscape).
4. Early public R&D, high tech-complexity:
The complexity of the technology is identical to that of scenario 3, but the
public sector only performs direct R&D investment in the early gestation
stage of innovation development.
Table 1 reports a summary of the scenarios just described, to ease under-
standing and for later reference throughout the analysis of results.
Table 1: Simulation scenarios
Tech-Complexity Public R&D Scenario
Medium
Throughout 1
Early stage 2
High
Throughout 3
Early stage 4
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To substantiate this description, Table 2 reports the parameters of our setup,
including a reference to the equation in the text where each parameter may be
found, the range of possible values and the particular value(s) adopted for our
simulations.
From Table 2 we see that the complexity of the technology stems from the
value of parameter aij in equation (3). The higher aij the higher the depen-
dence of the current dimension on the position in other dimensions to assess
the contribution to fitness. A higher value of aij increases the ruggedness of the
technology landscape. In our scenarios with medium complexity of the tech-
nology (scenarios 1 & 2), aij = a = 0.35, whereas in those with high complexity
(scenarios 3 & 4), aij = a = 0.65.
4.2 The Risk-Reward Nexus in the benchmark scenario: depicting the mecha-
nism to access innovation surplus profits
We first depict the evolution of some key variables of the model through time
for a typical run of our ‘benchmark’ parametrization (Scenario 1), and analyse
how some private agents obtain a share in innovation surplus profits greater
than the risks taken in technological exploration, relative to other agents and
the public sector.
A birds’-eye view is presented in Figure 3, consisting in four panels: final de-
mand, fitness, competition and knowledge accumulation. Final demand for the
industry’s product, F (t) in (9), is divided into its three income components:
dividends, wages and government income: Div(t) in (24), W (t) in (22) and
Y A(t) in (16), respectively. The outcome indicator of the process of technolog-
ical exploration, landscape fitness, is depicted for the average of private firms,
the public sector and the economy as a whole: ↵B(t) in (5), ↵A(t) in (6), and
↵(t) in (7), respectively. We consider two features of the competition regime:
the Herfindahl index of market concentration and the number of active firms
in the market, nB(t).13 Finally, we depict the shares in accumulated knowledge
of the public sector and private firms (distinguishing between those paying the
license and those who do not).14
During the gestation stage of the new technology, landscape exploration is
performed only by the public sector: final demand is at its minimum given
13We compute the Herfindahl index for each time period t as follows:
PnB(t)
i=1 ✓
i(t)2, where ✓i(t) is the market
share of firm i at time t, as specified in (11).
14The stock of knowledge of firm i as well as that of the public sector have been specified in expressions (29)
and (30), respectively.
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Figure 3: Final Demand, Fitness, Competition and Knowledge Accumulation
Scenario 1: Full-StateRD, medium-tech, stringent-competition
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the insu cient product quality to trigger a positive percentage of consumers
adopting the new product. It can be seen that throughout gestation (t 2
[0, 58]), average landscape fitness is determined by the fitness of the public
sector. Knowledge accumulation is entirely done by the public sector during
this phase. At t = 58, average fitness (i.e. product quality) reaches a point
associated to positive final demand,15 allowing for private firms to enter the
market at t = 59 and start a process of technological and market competition.
The contribution to accumulated knowledge is now shared between the public
sector and private firms,16 and firms paying the license to access the knowledge
reached by the public sector become the main contributor to the accumulation
of new knowledge.
Between the entry of the first private actors (at t = 59) and t = 95, the fitness
of the economy is mostly driven by that of the public sector: firms accumulate
knowledge by investing in R&D at a faster rate than the public sector, to
catch-up with the privileged position of the State. Concentration gradually
increases as entrants fail in their attempt to compete with incumbents, and
firms’ propensity to invest in R&D implies a growing share of wages in the
value of final demand.17
However, from t = 95 onwards the evolution of the industry exhibits higher
instability: dividends reap increasing shares of income, the average fitness of
private firms surpasses the public sector, market concentration fluctuates and
knowledge accumulation by private firms slows down. To grasp the mechanisms
leading to these outcomes, Table 3 reports a detailed picture of key indicators
at the level of individual agents that will be useful to uncover the switchover
in industry dynamics.
Each row of Table 3 corresponds to an agent (identified in column [1])
and columns [2] to [9] characterise its role within the industry. Agent 1 is
the public sector and subsequent rows report private firms in increasing order
according to their entry time. Agent 3 is the incumbent that obtains 79% of
accumulated profits (column [8]), with the highest reward (column [6]). It
has invested in R&D during an initial phase (which is reflected in the risks
taken), but after reaching a su ciently high market share it switches to a
regime of low R&D investment propensity, extracting a greater share of income
(in the form of dividends, as can be seen in Figure 3 from t = 110 onwards).
15The functional relationship between product quality and final demand was specified in (9).
16Accumulated knowledge consists in capitalised R&D investment that increases landscape fitness, as specified
in (29).
17As specified in (23), R&D expansion translates into wage payments to specialised workers in the industry.
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Table 3: Risks, Rewards, Share in Accumulated Profits and Knowledge Stock
(Baseline results, scenario 1: throughout-publicRD, medium-tech, stringent-competition)
Agent Entry Exit Pays Risk Reward RRN Profits Knowledge
Time Time License (time-average accum. in T ) Share Stock
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
1 1 150 0.551 0.427 0.774 0.00 66.05
2 59 103 Yes 0.053 0.181 3.439 1.23 0.00
3 59 150 Yes 0.312 7.844 25.134 79.28 291.94
4 64 123 No 0.090 0.757 8.402 6.93 0.00
5 64 96 Yes 0.027 0.050 1.877 0.25 0.00
20 104 120 No 0.023 0.884 38.014 2.09 0.00
21 104 150 Yes 0.064 1.299 20.188 3.90 43.77
22 109 150 Yes 0.050 1.068 21.445 2.36 28.04
23 109 112 No 0.004 0.278 69.054 0.09 0.00
24 114 119 No 0.016 0.736 45.204 0.46 0.00
25 114 150 Yes 0.023 1.270 56.218 1.80 24.15
26 119 150 Yes 0.015 1.220 83.455 0.77 12.45
27 119 150 Yes 0.016 1.312 82.545 0.83 12.78
(Weighted) Average Private Firms 0.259 6.415 25.257
Relative Risks and Rewards 0.470 15.023 32.631
Failure Rate 0.538
Specifications: Simulation steps = 150; entrants per entry-period = 2; entry interval = 4. Notes: Time period
T represents the simulation step in which the dominant design has been reached by one of the private firms;
columns [6]-[8] are time-averages of values accumulated up to period T ; weighted averages are computed
using the share in accumulated profits; the failure rate computes the proportion of firms that exited the
market after only one period with respect to total private firms.
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Its privileged position, though, has been achieved by taking advantage of early
entry supported by the public sector.
To understand the switchover in industry dynamics, note the performance
of private firms entering the industry from t = 95 onwards. Due to the e↵ort
(led by the public sector since the gestation phase) to increase product quality
through landscape exploration, the size of the market increases at faster pace,
new firms enter the market as old firms exit.18 But firms paying the license to
the public sector have a knowledge advantage: their late entry from a privileged
starting position to explore the technology landscape allows them to reap higher
profits with respect to the risks they incur.
In fact, entrants start from a landscape position that allows them to collec-
tively surpass the fitness score of the public sector. The Risk-Reward Nexus
(RRN, in column [7]) for private firms paying the license progressively in-
creases with entry time: entrants reap market share of the biggest incumbent
and obtain proportionally more profits than the risks they undertook through
landscape exploration. Thus, there is an imbalance between risks and rewards
(Mazzucato, 2013): the relative risks and rewards between private firms and
the public sector in Table 3 report how private firms incur in only (almost)
half of the risk taken by the public sector (0.47) but obtain an average reward
which is 15 times higher.
After the industry switchover, the Herfindahl index shows higher volatility as
competition gets more stringent between new entrants. However, the biggest
incumbent (agent 3) slows down investment in R&D and accelerates value ex-
traction when the size of the industry grows exponentially. Inequality sets in:
the share of dividends takes over wages and firms which do not pay the li-
cense to the public sector exit the market (in aggregate terms their share in
the knowledge stock in Figure 3 tends to zero). The extent of inequity disrupts
investment in the innovation process and is mirrored by the appropriation of
surplus profits from innovation by incumbents who benefited from the early ex-
ploration by the public sector, as well as by late entrants who take advantage
of continuous exploration by the State.
Given the medium level complexity of the new technology, landscape explo-
ration by private firms reaches the dominant design by t = 123. However, it
remains to be seen how this stylised account of relative risks and rewards is
modified when considering each of the alternative scenarios previously defined.
18As reported in Table 3, the failure rate in the industry, defined as the proportion of firms that exited the
market after only one period with respect to total private firms, reaches almost 54%.
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How will the imbalance between risks and rewards change with a higher com-
plexity of the new technology and, most importantly, when the public sector is
only directly involved in R&D at an early stage of the innovation process? We
turn to this question in the sections that follow.
4.3 Metrics
In order to compare alternative scenarios we introduce a set of metrics, specified
in Table 4. We consider indicators regarding: inequality, knowledge accumula-
tion, rewards, risks and the risk-reward nexus (RRN, hereinafter). In each case
we compute time-averages of accumulated variables up to time-period T and/or
at the values they adopt in T . Time period T represents the simulation step
in which the dominant design has been reached by one of the private firms.19
The extent of inequality is captured by the shares of government income,
wages and dividends in accumulated final demand (indicators 1.1-1.3). The
wage share in household income (indicator 1.4) proxies the extent of value ex-
traction: increasing dividends slow down R&D investment and the development
of skills by R&D workers. Finally, the share in accumulated profits of private
firms, distinguishing those with from those without a license to access the new
technology (indicators 1.5-1.6) quantifies the advantage of the former over the
latter, due to the presence of the public sector throughout the innovation pro-
cess.
The process of landscape exploration leads to knowledge accumulation as long
as landscape steps are fitness improving. The shares of the public sector and
private firms (with and without a license) in the knowledge stock (indicators
2.1-2.3) assess the contribution of each agent type to the innovation process.
Whereas the indicators introduced so far contextualise important aspects to
understand industry evolution under each alternative scenario, the key indica-
tors of the model concern those quantifying rewards (indicators 3.1-3.3), risks
(indicators 4.1-4.3) and the risk-reward nexus (indicators 5.1-5.3) for the public
sector, private firms and the relation between them.20
19Taking T as the end-period of our analysis is justified by the fact that the key aspects of technological and
market competition are reflected in what happens up to the point when a firm reaches the dominant design.
From that point onwards, it may as well happen that the public sector and private firms move on to develop
another technology (exploring a new fitness landscape).
20The rationale for the metrics of rewards, risks and the risk-reward nexus can be found in the description of
the model, in section 3 above.
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Table 4: Simulation metrics: specification of indicators computed
(Time period T represents the simulation step in which the dominant design has been reached by one of the private firms)
Indicator Formula Reference Eqs.
Inequality
Shares in Accumulated Final Demand
1.1 Government Income
PT
t=1 Y
A(t)/
PT
t=1 F (t) (9), (16)
1.2 Wages
PT
t=1W (t)/
PT
t=1 F (t) (9), (22)
1.3 Dividends
PT
t=1Div(t)/
PT
t=1 F (t) (9), (24)
1.4 Wage share in Household Income
PT
t=1W (t)/
PT
t=1 Y
H(t) (21), (22)
Share in Accumulated Profits
1.5 Private Firms (license)
PT
t=1
PnLicB (t)
i=1 ⇡
i(t)/
PT
t=1⇧(t) (12), (24)
1.6 Private Firms (no license)
PT
t=1
PnNLicB (t)
i=1 ⇡
i(t)/
PT
t=1⇧(t) (12), (24)
Knowledge
Accumula-
tion
Shares in Knowledge Stock K(T ) =
PnB(T )
i=1 K
i(T ) +KA(T )
2.1 Public KA(T )/K(T ) (30)
2.2 Private Firms (license)
PnLicB (T )
i=1 K
i(T )/K(T ) (29)
2.3 Private Firms (no license)
PnNLicB (T )
i=1 K
i(T )/K(T ) (29)
Rewards
3.1 Private Firms µB(T ) (35)
3.2 Public Sector µA(T ) (36)
3.3 Relative Rewards (Private/Public) µBA(T ) (37)
Risks
4.1 Private Firms  B(T ) (31)
4.2 Public Sector  A(T ) (32)
4.3 Relative Risk (Private/Public)  BA (T ) (33)
Risk-Reward Nexus
5.1 Private Firms RRN
B
(T ) (38)
5.2 Public Sector RRNA(T ) (38)
5.3 Relative Risk-Reward (Private/Public) RRNBA (T ) (39)
Notes: nNLicB (t) = nB(t) nLicB (t) represents the number of private firms that do not pay the license to access the new technology,
present in time period t.
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4.4 The Risk-Reward Nexus under alternative scenarios
The indicators presented in Table 4 apply to each simulation run for every
alternative scenario. In order compare the scenarios summarised in Table 1, we
compute across-run averages over 50 replications for each scenario and report
these averages in Table 5.
Our main interest lies in statistically comparing scenarios 1 with 2 and 3
with 4, given that each couple di↵ers only in the role of the public sector: in
odd-numbered scenarios the public sector directly invests in R&D throughout
the innovation chain, whereas in even-numbered ones the public sector only
invests in R&D during the gestation phase of landscape exploration. After-
wards, it is only private firms that explore the technology landscape. To assess
whether across-run averages are statistically di↵erent within each couple of sce-
narios we perform a Welch’s unequal variances t-test and report p-values in the
corresponding columns of Table 5.21
We structure the interpretation of results by answering three (related) ques-
tions in turn.
21The null hypothesis being that means are not statistically di↵erent.
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4.5 How does the presence of the public sector directly investing in R&D alter
the balance of risks and rewards?
In all cases, rewards within each couple of scenarios statistically di↵er.22 Figure
4 displays boxplots for private, public and relative rewards across scenarios,
providing a more detailed picture beyond across-run averages.
Figure 4: Private, Public and Relative Rewards
Bar: median, square: mean, rectangular box: 2nd-3rd quartile, whiskers: max-min, dots: outliers
The presence of the public sector throughout the innovation chain (odd-
numbered scenarios) implies average rewards for private firms which are 60%
(scenario 1) and 90% (scenario 3) those of the corresponding even-numbered
scenarios (scenarios 2 and 4, respectively), in which the public sector only in-
vests in early R&D. As regards the public sector, direct R&D e↵orts throughout
the innovation process imply a surplus which is only 36% (scenario 1) and 54%
(scenario 3) that of even-numbered scenarios, respectively. In relative terms,
the average reward of the private relative to the public sector increases no-
toriously when the latter directly invests in R&D throughout the innovation
process. With medium-level technological complexity relative rewards of sce-
nario 1 are 1.96 times those of scenario 2. However, when the complexity of
new technology is high, this gap is reduced to 1.67 times (comparing between
scenarios 3 and 4). As expected, relative (private/public) rewards decrease
22Only in the case of rewards for private firms in scenarios 3 and 4, characterised by high complexity of the
new technology, the di↵erence is statistically significant at a 10% level.
31
when the public sector leaves the process of R&D (beyond the gestation phase)
to private firms.
When we turn to risks, mean di↵erences for public and relative risks are sta-
tistically significant in all cases, whereas for private firms this is so only for the
comparison between scenarios 1 and 2: risks di↵erences for private firms when
comparing scenarios 3 with 4 are not statistically significant. Figure 5 displays
boxplots for private, public and relative risks across scenarios, providing a more
detailed picture beyond across-run averages.
Figure 5: Private, Public and Relative Risk
Bar: median, square: mean, rectangular box: 2nd-3rd quartile, whiskers: max-min, dots: outliers
As expected, risks increase for the public sector when directly invests in
R&D throughout the innovation chain. Whereas this is the case for private
firms in a scenario of medium-level technological complexity, risks of landscape
exploration are not statistically di↵erent for private firms in scenarios of high
technological complexity (scenarios 3 and 4). To explain this, note that high
technological complexity forces firms to invest in R&D if they are to make
fitness-improving landscape steps.
This notwithstanding, when comparing relative risks (which is always our
main interest), an active presence of the public sector involves a sharp decrease
in relative (private/public) risks across scenarios: there is an unambiguous
increase in the risk taken by the public sector with respect to that of private
actors.
More importantly, the joint consideration of rewards and risks by observing
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indicators 5.1-5.3 of Table 5 allows us to conclude that, when the public sector
is directly involved in R&D investment throughout the innovation chain, the
sharp increase in the relative (private/public) risk-reward nexus (rewards/risks)
is statistically significant across scenarios.23 Figure 6 displays boxplots for
private, public and relative risk-reward nexus, providing a more detailed picture
beyond across-run averages.
Figure 6: Private, Public and Relative Risk-Reward Nexus
Bar: median, square: mean, rectangular box: 2nd-3rd quartile, whiskers: max-min, dots: outliers
As regards the government, the higher risk incurred by taking an active part
in R&D beyond the gestation phase is not compensated by a corresponding
reward: the risk-reward nexus (rewards/risks) of the public sector decreases in
odd-numbered scenarios.
Moreover, the rightmost panel of Figure 6 evinces the extent of the imbalance
between risks and rewards when comparing private firms with the public sec-
tor. In scenarios of medium-level technological complexity (scenarios 1-2), the
risk-reward nexus (RRN) is 5.52 times higher when the public sector actively
invests in R&D. This gap is reduced to a factor of 1.8 in the presence of high
technological complexity (scenarios 3-4).
Thus, we may conclude that the presence of the public sector directly invest-
ing in R&D alters the public-private balance of risks and rewards. If the State
leaves the process of R&D investment to private firms, there is an increase
23With the exception of the comparison between scenarios 1 and 2 for private firms, mean di↵erences for
private, public and relative risk-reward nexus are always statistically significant across scenarios.
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in its relative income position. But by taking an active part in technological
exploration, there is an increase in the relative risk it takes, which is not com-
pensated by the rewards it obtains from tax revenues and license costs paid by
private actors.
All in all, the relative risk-reward nexus (rewards/risks) increases in favour
of private firms whenever the public sector directly invests in R&D throughout
the innovation chain, and this increase is sharper the lower the complexity of
the new technology (i.e. the ruggedness of the fitness landscape).
4.6 How does the financing of innovation by private actors lead to higher in-
equality?
Having ascertained the increasing imbalance between relative risks and rewards
in favour of private firms when the public sector is actively involved in landscape
exploration, we study how the division of innovative labour maps into a division
of rewards (Mazzucato, 2013, p. 198). By observing indicators 1.1-1.6 and 2.1-
2.3 in Table 5, we see to what extent the shares in accumulated income of
the government investing in R&D and workers actively pursuing R&D e↵orts
commensurate with their investment.
In all cases, mean di↵erences between scenarios for indicators concerning
inequality and knowledge accumulation are statistically significant. Under each
scenario comparison, the active presence of the public sector investing in R&D
throughout the innovation process significantly increases the wage share in
(accumulated) income.
In the scenarios corresponding to our benchmark configuration (scenarios
1-2), the decrease in the wage share when R&D investment is left to private
firms is of more than 10 percentage points (from 55% to 44% of accumulated
income). Such a decrease is mirrored by an increase in the share of dividends
(of 5.6 percentage points) and government income (of 5.3 percentage points).
In fact, a State focusing merely in obtaining a fiscal surplus out of R&D e↵orts
during the gestation phase results in a relatively lower wage share. Interestingly,
distributive shifts between odd and even-numbered scenarios are milder when
technological complexity is high.
These trends are confirmed when analysing the share of wages in household
income (indicator 1.4 of Table 5). Figure 7 displays boxplots for the wage share
in household income and the share of the public sector in the knowledge stock,
providing a more detailed picture beyond across-run averages.
As expected, the share of the public sector in accumulated knowledge is
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Figure 7: Inequality and Knowledge Accumulation
Bar: median, square: mean, rectangular box: 2nd-3rd quartile, whiskers: max-min, dots: outliers
higher in odd-numbered scenarios with respect to even-numbered ones. Whereas
in scenarios 1 the share of the public sector is 16%, it accounts for 31% of the
knowledge stock in scenario 3, i.e. when the complexity of the technology is
high. To better grasp the imbalance between rewards and contribution to
knowledge in this scenario, the public sector contributes to 30% of the stock
of knowledge but gets only 15% of accumulated government income plus divi-
dends.24
Note that we compare public/private shares in the knowledge stock and
public/private shares in government income plus dividends, as wages are the
vehicle e↵ectively implementing R&D e↵orts accumulated by both private firms
and the public sector. Workers are the ultimate source of skills and innovation
development in our framework. Hence, by increasing the wage share with its
direct action through R&D investment, the public sector drives the process of
landscape exploration towards a situation in which the distribution of finan-
cial rewards reflects to a higher extent the distribution of contributions to the
innovation process.
24From the column corresponding to scenario 3 in Table 5, indicators 1.1 and 1.3, we have that
0.048/(0.048+0.273)=0.15.
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4.7 How could the public sector design an adaptive policy to realign risks and
rewards?
Throughout scenarios 1-4 the policy variables available to the public sector
have been considered constant and equal across settings. Thus, a key aspect of
our model that we explore in this section is the implementation of an adaptive
policy strategy by the public sector to realign the imbalance between risks and
rewards.
In particular, the public sector has two instruments to influence the appropri-
ation of gains from the innovation process: the tax rate on revenues of private
firms — ⌧ in (12) — and the license fee rate charged to private firms in order
to access the new technology — ⇠ in (17).
The idea of the simulation exercise below is to implement an adaptive policy
rule such that the Risk-Reward Nexus of the public sector directly investing in
R&D throughout the innovation chain (scenarios 1 and 3 in Table 1) approaches
that obtained when the public sector is involved only in the early stages of R&D
investment (scenarios 2 and 4 in Table 1).
To this aim, we define two additional scenarios — 5 and 6 — which resemble
in every respect scenarios 1 and 3, the only di↵erence being the implementation
of an adapative policy strategy by the public sector. Table 6 summarises the
characterisation of the scenarios considered in this section.
Table 6: Simulation scenarios: Adaptive vs. Static policy
Tech-Complexity Public R&D Policy Scenario
Medium
Throughout Adaptive 5
Early stage Static 2
High
Throughout Adaptive 6
Early stage Static 4
The adaptive policy rule implemented by the public sector in scenarios 5 and
6 consists in adjusting (by 1 percentage point per period) rates (⌧, ⇠) through
time, in correspondence with the gap in the public risk-reward nexus between
the throughout R&D investment scenario (RRNA) and the early R&D scenario
(RRNA,⇤).25
25More precisely, the gap measured is that between the value of RRNA within each simulation run and the
average (across instances of every corresponding type of ‘early R&D only’ scenario) value of RRNA,⇤, in
each time-period.
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Thus, for the case of the tax rate on revenues we have:
⌧(t) =
(
⌧(t  1) + 0.01, if RRNA(t  1) < RRNA,⇤(t  1)
⌧(t  1)  0.01, if RRNA(t  1) > RRNA,⇤(t  1) (40)
where ⌧ = 0.1 sets a lower bound to the downward adjustments.
⇠(t) =
(
⇠(t  1) + 0.01, if RRNA(t  1) < RRNA,⇤(t  1)
⇠(t  1)  0.01, if RRNA(t  1) > RRNA,⇤(t  1) (41)
where ⇠ = 0.03 sets a lower bound to the downward adjustments.26
Table 7 reports the results of the simulation exercise. Also in this case, in
order to compare the scenarios summarised in Table 6, we compute across-
run averages over 50 replications for each scenario, perform a Welch’s unequal
variances t-test between scenarios 5-2 and 6-4, and report p-values in the cor-
responding columns of the table.
The key result from Table 7 is that, by adapting taxation and licensing
policies, the public sector can realign the Risk-Reward Nexus between ‘early
R&D only’ and ‘R&D throughout’ investment scenarios. The average license
fee rate across time and simulation runs should be increased from 3% to a range
between 18.8% and 20.9% (row 6.1 of the table), whereas the average tax rate
on revenues across time and simulation runs should be raised from 10% to a
range between 26.9% and 29.6% (row 6.2 of the table).
By so doing, the public sector obtains a reward (row 3.2 of the table) in
scenarios 5 and 6 which is statistically higher than that of scenarios 2 and 4.
Such a higher reward corresponds to a higher risk (row 4.2 of table) taken by the
public sector. Thus, the resulting Risk-Reward Nexus (row 5.2 of the table) in
each ‘R&D throughout’ scenario, though statistically di↵erent, approaches the
public Risk-Reward Nexus of the corresponding ‘early R&D only’ scenario.27
26Values ⌧ = 0.10 and ⇠ = 0.03 correspond to the calibration adopted in the static policy setting, see Table 2
for details.
27Being a simulation model, it is not possible to obtain an ex-post closed form computation of the combination
of (⌧, ⇠) that exactly equalise public RRN across scenarios. This is so because each adjustment to the policy
variables will have implications on the dynamics of the system, as private agents change their actions in
response to the ongoing change in policy variables.
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Finally, results suggest that the relative Risk-Reward Nexus between private
firms and the public sector (row 5.3 in the table) are only statistically di↵erent
between scenarios 5 and 2. And even in this case, the di↵erence is of second
order. Thus, by implementing adaptive taxation and licensing policies the
public sector has managed to realign relative (private/public) risks and rewards
for each combination of ‘early R&D only’ and ‘R&D throughout’ scenarios.
5 Concluding remarks
The present paper introduces an agent-based simulation framework to study the
interaction between the public sector and private firms in a process of innovation
di↵usion through technological competition. The progressive mastery of the
new technology by economic agents results from the collective exploration of
a fitness landscape, in which landscape steps depend on the extent of (public
and private) R&D investment. However, higher amounts of R&D investment
do not guarantee an advantageous market position: landscape exploration is a
risky process subject to technological lock-in.
Moreover, we restrict our attention to a single industry using a technology to
produce a final good of varying quality. The dynamics of final output follows
the growth of final demand. Market competition is modelled by a (tamed)
replicator equation: market shares evolve according to product quality di↵er-
entials.
Thus, our model exhibits the Keynesian feature by which production capacity
adapts to the growth of final demand, and the Schumpeterian feature by which
R&D investments do not automatically translate into innovation development,
due to the inherent uncertainties assocaited to innovation.
The public sector directly invests in R&D, either at an early stage or through-
out the innovation chain, charging a license cost to firms in order to access
accumulated technological knowledge. Private firms may take advantage of
the privileged landscape position reached by the public sector, acquiring the
license to operate the new technology and obtaining a relatively high fitness
score, product quality and market share, thus accessing innovation suruplus
profits. Profits made by firms are channelled as dividends, whereas investment
in R&D contributes to the development of skills of R&D workers, increasing
wages.
Within this framework, we introduce a series of metrics to capture the ex-
tent of the imbalance of risks and rewards between public and private actors,
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studying these across alternative scenarios that are (parametrically) defined
according to: (i) the degree of direct involvement of the public sector in R&D
investment and (ii) the complexity of the new technology introduced.
The time evolution of key variables of the model for a typical run of our
‘benchmark’ parametrization suggests that when market size grows exponen-
tially, the industry exhibits higher instability: dividends reap increasing shares
of income, the average fitness of private firms surpasses the public sector, mar-
ket concentration fluctuates and aggregate knowledge accumulation by private
firms slows down (Mazzucato, 2013, p. 199).
The key mechanism behind this dynamics concerns the fact that latecomer
firms paying the license to the public sector have a sizeable knowledge ad-
vantage: their late entry from a privileged starting position to explore the
technology landscape allows them to reap higher profits with respect to the
risks they incur.
From the analysis of the simulation results for the scenarios devised, it
emerges that the relative risk-reward nexus (rewards/risks) increases in favour
of private firms whenever the public sector directly invests in R&D throughout
the innovation chain, and this increase is sharper the lower the complexity of
the new technology (i.e. the ruggedness of the fitness landscape).
At the same time, in our framework workers are the ultimate source of skills
and innovation development. Hence, by increasing the wage share with its di-
rect action through R&D investment, the public sector drives the process of
landscape exploration towards a situation in which the distribution of finan-
cial rewards reflects to a larger extent the distribution of contributions to the
innovation process.
Finally, by implementing an adaptive rule for taxation and licensing, we
quantified the increase in the tax rate on revenues and the license fee rate
that allow the public sector to realign the Risk-Reward Nexus between ‘early
R&D only’ and ‘R&D throughout’ investment scenarios. Thus, when public
funds are consistently invested throughout the innovation chain, we show how
it should be possible to benefit from the upside, so that a next round of in-
novative investment can be supported via a ‘revolving fund’ (Mazzucato and
Perez, 2014). Further research on this direction should compare di↵erent in-
novation ‘eco-systems’ in relation to di↵erent risk levels and types of finance
(public/private).28
28As well as di↵erent institutional financial setups (e.g. market-based vs. credit-based) in relation to the
evolution of the industry (Dosi, 1990).
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